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Abstract—We show how voltage glitching can cause timing
violations in CMOS behavior. Then we attack a real, security
hardened, consumer device to gain code execution and dump the
secure boot ROM.
I. INTRODUCTION
Glitching, or fault injection, has been used for over a decade
[1] to attack software running on secure execution environ-
ments. Due to the upward trend in pricing in the software
exploit market [8] and the increased hardening of security
in consumer devices, there has been a rise in popularity of
injecting faults to gain control of a device. Fault injections
can be used to cause a malfunction in the target’s system-on-
chip (SoC) and, when the malfunction is controlled properly,
can be used by an attacker to take full control of the device.
Voltage glitching is a specific kind of fault injection and
is attractive because is it inexpensive to set up and is widely
applicable to most chips [2]. Crowbar voltage glitching was
introduced by O’Flynn [6] and implemented in the Chip-
Whisperer open hardware platform to bring these attacks to
the mainstream. It works by abusing the capacitance ringing
effect caused by introducing a crowbar circuit into the existing
system. The ringing causes faults that can be exploited.
A. Background
We looked at the prior attempts at modeling voltage fault
injections and ordered them in terms of abstraction (see
table I). Most recently, in a paper by Timmers, Spruyt, and
Witteman [9], they created an architectural model of fault
injection for ARM devices. Their model considers instruction
corruption due to bit-flips caused by the fault. Their model is
applicable to many kinds of fault injection.
Another paper we drew inspiration comes from Zussa,
Dutertre, Cle´die`re and Tria [10]. Their work focused on
confirming empirically that the mechanism for faults induced
by voltage glitching is due to setup/hold time violations.
They concluded that voltage glitches increased the propagation
time of combinational logic which creates setup/hold time
violations. Another connection we make is that while their
paper wanted empirical evidence for a wide-held belief in how
voltage glitches work we want a rigorous theoretical model for
the same wide-held belief.
One level down from that is the paper by Djellid-Ouar,
Cathebras and Bancel [4] which concluded that D-flip-flops
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Fig. 1. Standard CMOS inverter with load capacitance CL
(and therefore most memory elements) were mostly immune to
standard voltage attacks. Their paper analyzed bistable CMOS
elements using the small signal model.
In addition to modeling voltage glitches, there has been
many experiments in applying voltage fault injections to affect
processor operations on complex SoCs. The aforementioned
paper from Timmers, Spruyt, and Witteman [9] details a
bypass of a secure boot code integrity check on an ARM
processor through voltage glitching. O’Flynn [6] used his
crowbar method on a Raspberry Pi computer to modify the
result of a running counter.
The PlayStation Vita was a hand-held gaming console
released in 2012. It used a custom designed Samsung 45nm
SoC [3]. The SoC includes a MeP architecture processor which
we nicknamed “F00D,” that performs cryptographic tasks and
serves as the boot processor. The boot ROM used by F00D is
unmapped early in the boot process and is then unable to be
read out through pure software means.
Our contribution will be in two separate domains. In section
II, we will analyze the CMOS transistor behavior in order to
understand when the combinational logic is most susceptible
to voltage glitch induced faults. Then, in section III we will
apply our understanding to perform a fault injection attack on
the PlayStation Vita’s SoC to gain early (boot time) execution
control of F00D in order to dump the boot ROM.
II. CMOS VOLTAGE GLITCH MODEL
To analyze the CMOS behavior during a voltage glitch,
we will only consider the voltages near the gate itself. This
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TABLE I
RELATED WORKS IN MODELING VOLTAGE GLITCHES
Paper Year Level Applicability Results
TSW [9] 2016 Architectural ARM, any glitches Faults modeled by corrupted instructions
ZDCT [10] 2013 Digital Logic Voltage/clock glitching Fault caused by setup/hold violations
DCB [4] 2006 Gates/Elements Voltage glitching D-flip-flops not susceptible to voltage glitches
This Paper 2018 Transistor Voltage glitching Effects are data dependent
TABLE II
NOTATIONS USED
VDD Supply voltage (normal operations)
VSS Ground voltage (typically 0V)
V ′DD Glitch supply voltage (typically ∼ 0V)
Vin CMOS input voltage
Vout CMOS output voltage
CL Gate load capacitance (simplified)
VSG Voltage from PMOS source to PMOS gate
VTH PMOS threshold voltage
VIL Switching threshold for input low
VIH Switching threshold for input high
Reqp PMOS equivalent resistance with source VDD
Reqn NMOS equivalent resistance with source VSS
R′eqp PMOS equivalent resistance with source V ′DD
tpHL Propagation delay for output going low
tpLH Propagation delay for output going high
τA Glitch start time
τB Glitch end time
tG τB − τA
tgHL Propagation delay for output going
low during glitch (to be defined)
tgLH Propagation delay for output going
high during glitch (to be defined)
simplification will disregard everything that happens when the
voltage pads on the IC is suddenly changed. For example, if
a crowbar circuit is used to quickly short VDD to VSS for
some amount of time, we do not actually observe a short at
the MOSFET. Instead, the capacitance and the power-delivery-
network of the circuit will create a ringing effect [6] that
will be observed at the MOSFET. Our analysis will therefore
only consider the duration and amplitude of these rings as the
“glitch” and not the source of them. We note that a more in
depth analysis can incorporate such external effects without
affecting our understanding of what happens at the MOSFET.
A. Notation
We will use standard notation where applicable. For con-
venience, they are defined in table II along with other labels
relevant in our analysis.
B. Motivation
Consider a standard 1-input CMOS gate (an inverter, figure
1). Let Vin be the input voltage and Vout be the output.
We define a voltage glitch to be a span of time from τA to
τB during which, we set VDD ← V ′DD. V ′DD is the glitch
voltage (and ideally V ′DD = VSS). tG = τB − τA is the glitch
width. CL represents the load capacitance and includes the
gate parasitic capacitances, the wire capacitance, and the input
capacitance of the next gate.
We will focus on the span of time between τA and τB when
the voltage glitch happens. Looking at only one inverter, we
V ′DD
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Fig. 2. Equivalent circuit for PMOS in non-saturation.
see that in that span of time, the input could either toggle at
least one time or not toggle at all. We will analyze the behavior
of the inverter in both cases to see when the output value can
be influenced by the glitch.
C. Non-toggling
First, consider the case when Vin does not change during
the voltage glitch. If the input is a logical ‘1’ (Vin ≥ VIH )
then the output would be at Vout = VSS . Since VSG < VTH ,
the PMOS is off and there is no source for Vout to change.
Therefore the voltage glitch caused no change in behavior.
If the input is at logical ‘0’ (Vin ≤ VIL), then before the
voltage glitch, Vin = VSS and Vout = VDD. When the glitch
happens, the PMOS will be on, so we can use the equivalent
resistance model defined in Chapter 5.4 of [7] to analyze the
dynamic behavior.
Using equation 5.17 in [7], we find the fall time to be
tgHL = ln(2)ReqpCL (1)
where Reqp is the on-resistance of the PMOS at the glitch
voltage V ′DD. Note that this is slightly different from the
commonly used value tpHL (fall time of the inverter) because
tpHL is defined with respect to Reqn, the on-resistance of the
NMOS.
The output goes to ‘0’ for the duration of the glitch and
then is be restored to ‘1’ as VDD is restored to its pre-glitch
value. This means that if the input is ‘0’ at the start of the
voltage glitch and does not toggle, then the output will be low
from τA + tgHL to τB + tpLH (assuming tgHL  tG). Note
this is similar to a static hazard, which can cause setup and
hold time issues.
D. Toggling
Consider a transition from a logical ‘0’ to ‘1’ at the input
during the voltage glitch (from τA to τB). Since this turns
off the PMOS, there should be no change in behavior at the
output (compared to what happens if it toggles while there is
no voltage glitch). However, if the transition is from a logical
‘1’ to ‘0’, then according to [10], the rise time of the inverter
output, tgLH increases as V ′DD decreases. Additionally, if the
glitch voltage V ′DD < VTH , then the output will not go
high for the duration of the voltage glitch (tgLH would be
infinite). So this means the propagation delay increases as
V ′DD decreases up to tG. This also causes setup and hold time
issues.
E. Results
In both cases, we see that the delay introduced to a single
gate by a voltage glitch is composed of a rise/fall time (tgHL
or tgLH depending on the input value), the glitch width tG, and
finally the delay for when VDD is “restored” and the “correct”
input must propagate to the output again (tpLH ). We can define
tg to be the propagation delay of that inverter during a voltage
glitch from the input to the output (we consider the value to
be “propagated” only when the output has the correct value).
From above, we see this can be broken into four cases.
tg,non-toggle,0 ≥
{
tG + tpLH , if tgHL > tG
tG − tgHL + tpLH , otherwise
tg,non-toggle,1 = 0
tg,toggle,0-to-1 ≥
{
tG + tpLH , if tgLH > tG
tgLH , otherwise
tg,toggle,1-to-0 = tpHL
(2)
Now, if we have a chain of N inverters, we can find the
total propogation through the chain considering that only the
first inverter is affected by the voltage glitch (with delay tg0 =
(tg,non-toggle,0 + tg,toggle,0-to-1)/2, the average delay of the two
cases that are affected by a voltage glitch). Note that if two
inverters in a chain are affected, we do not care about the
status of the later inverter because the earlier one will already
propagate its corrupted value and later corrected value down
the chain.
tg(N) = tg0 + (N − 1) tpLH + tpHL
2
(3)
In practice tgHL, tgLH , tpHL, tpLH will all be very small
compared to tG1. Therefore we can simplify equation 3 to:
tg(N) ≥ tG +N tpLH + tpHL
2
(4)
Note that the second part is just the CMOS propagation
time with fanout 1. That means as long as tG is much greater
1tpHL and tpLH are around the order of 30ps for 0.25 µm CMOS
technology [7].
than the rise/fall time of the output, the propagation delay is
bounded by the CMOS delay plus the glitch width.
Of course in reality, the analysis gets a lot more compli-
cated. First, the voltage glitch will not affect every CMOS at
the same time. There will be a sort of “propagation delay” of
the voltage change itself. Second, when we consider 2-input
gates and higher, there could be a mixture of non-toggling and
toggling behavior at each gate. Then of course, there are the
non-linear capacitance that makes computing CL difficult.
However, there are some conclusions we can draw from this
analysis.
• Asynchronous circuits are most affected by voltage
glitches due to the introduction of hazards.
• Synchronous circuits are not immune if the voltage glitch
cause a setup/hold time violation.
• Critical paths can be extended if a voltage glitch happens
at the right time (0-static or 1-toggling).
• Long critical paths are the best targets for voltage glitch-
ing (i.e: processor ALU).
III. VITA GLITCHING
The firmware and boot loader are found on an external
eMMC storage, which has logical sectors 512 bytes wide.
Upon boot, sector 0, the master boot record is read. The Vita’s
MBR is a custom format not used in any other device. The
details of this MBR format are beyond the scope of this paper,
but two fields are of importance. bldr offset is at MBR
offset 0x30 and bldr size is at MBR offset 0x34. These
two fields are both 4 bytes wide and both the offset and size
are defined in number of sectors. They are used by the boot
ROM to determine where the boot loader is located.
One thing we discovered early on (through trial and error)
was that if bldr size > 0xDE, then an assertion fails and the
device is rebooted. Otherwise, the eMMC is read starting at
the offset for bldr size blocks. Our hypothesis is that there
is a fixed size buffer that the boot loader is read into which
necessitates the size check. If we use a fault injection to bypass
this check, we can introduce a buffer overflow vulnerability.
A. Experimental Setup
There were three main components to our setup. First, we
needed a way to monitor the eMMC traffic and use it as a
trigger for the voltage glitch. Second, we needed a way to
perform the voltage glitch. Finally, we wished to automate the
steps in order to find the optimal parameters for glitching.
Fortunately, the ChipWhisperer gave us an easy way to do
all of this. The hardware has a MOSFET that performs the
crowbar voltage glitch [6]. The open hardware design allowed
us to implement a custom eMMC trigger for the MOSFET (see
appendix A-A). Finally, because the timing and duration of the
voltage glitch is highly dependent on the power distribution
network of the device [6], it is difficult to compute the optimal
timing parameters for a successful glitch on the size check.
Instead, we exhaustively searched for the timing offset and
width of the crowbar activation after being triggered that
results in a successful fault injection.
Additionally, we made sure to synchronize the ChipWhis-
perer’s glitch module clock with the device’s external clock
input. This way we can make sure the two devices are in phase
and decrease the variance in finding working parameters.
B. Parameters
For a successful fault injection, we need to find parameters
f , the clock frequency of the glitch module and the Vita’s
external clock input, N , the number of cycles after seeing the
eMMC trigger before activating the crowbar circuit and M ,
the number of cycles to hold the crowbar on before releasing
it. Note that these parameters will determine the response of
the ringing effect that will ultimately cause a fault in the size
comparison2.
We know from experimentation3 that F00D boot ROM runs
at fclk = 19f (where f is the external clock input). A faster
clock will increase the chance of a successful fault (due to
timing violations). In practice, we cannot over-clock much past
the default rate of 37MHz or we will run into non-voltage
glitch related timing violations that prevent the circuit from
working properly4. However, in our case, because of the noisy
design of our glitching setup, we picked f = 12MHz since
it was the fastest we were able to go without running into a
variety of signal integrity issues.
For N and M , we chose to brute force every possible value
to find ones that worked.
For the parameter search, we first used manual analysis to
get a ballpark idea of when bldr size is being checked. We
hypothesized that the check must happen after the response
packet for the eMMC READ SINGLE BLOCK request for the
MBR block. First we narrowed the window for the search to
be the period of time between commands. We measured the
amount of time from the response of READ SINGLE BLOCK
packet (with a valid bldr size) to the request of the
SEND STATUS5 packet using a Rigol DS1054Z oscilloscope.
At fclk = 12/9MHz, it took 36ms6. This yields an upper
bound for N .
When an attempt fails with a particular N , M pair, we
observe one of the following behaviors:
• The device halts. Usually we only see this with very large
M so it’s likely the CMOS is losing power and shutting
off.
2Many sources mention removing decoupling capacitors for better result
without giving a detailed reason. We were able to get voltage glitches to
work both with and without removing the decoupling capacitors. It is our
belief that removing the decoupling capacitors changes the response of the
ringing and therefore the parameters for a successful glitch. But in our case,
it does not make it any more or less tractable.
3Toggle GPIO and measure with the Rigol DS1054Z.
4This might be prevented with, for example, better cooling but we did not
go down this avenue.
5Defined as part of the eMMC read procedure [5].
6We discovered that due to a bug, the boot ROM spins the processor to
wait for the READ SINGLE BLOCK request to complete. However, the smallest
granularity of the spin time is about 1000 times the average amount of time
it takes for the command to complete (as we observed on the DS1054Z). So
to make things easier, our brute force actually ran backwards starting from
the far end of the window.
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Fig. 3. Parameter search process
• The device reboots and we observe the eMMC
GO IDLE STATE packet. This is the most common ob-
servation7.
• The device goes into an unknown state and makes an
unexpected request (and possibly restarts).
• The device requests the first block of the bootloader (this
is the success case).
We therefore only need to record the next packet seen after
reading MBR (or time out) and check if it is the first block of
the boot loader to indicate success. Figure 3 summarizes the
7We believe this is due to the fault happening at the wrong place or not
happening at all. Both of which would cause an assertion to fail. Originally
we wanted to try some timing attack to differentiate the two cases. However
we later found out that the designers actually anticipated this and masked
any reboot triggered by an assertion fail to first spin for a random number of
cycles determined by a TRNG to make it hard to determine “which” assertion
fail caused the reboot.
TABLE III
RANGE OF WORKING P
Parameter Units Min Max
f Hz 12 12
N cycles 40800 40820
M cycles 45 55
process.
C. Results
After writing a script with the ChipWhisperer API to
try all possible N and M values (see appendix A-B) and
running it overnight, we found a successful case with the
following parameters (see table III). Due to the effects of
wire capacitance and external capacitance, the parameters are
highly specific to our setup and environment. However, after
finding a valid N ,M pair, even with environmental variations,
we can find another valid N ,M pair close by. If the equipment
and target board and not moved or touched at all, we can
reproduce the injected fault with the same N ,M for > 80%
of the time.
D. Exploiting
We managed to find the glitch parameters N and M that
faults the bldr size check. However this only gives us a
vulnerability. We still need to exploit it. Fortunately, this
was made easy when we observed that when the glitch was
successful, we see exactly 0xE2 blocks read if bldr size ≥
0xE2. If bldr size < 0xE2, then it will read bldr size
blocks exactly (with a successful glitch). Therefore we guessed
that we were overwriting the currently executed code and
that guess was correct. With that, we launched a payload that
dumped everything we can read through UART.
Unfortunately we then discovered the boot ROM does not
seem to be mapped anywhere. It appears that hardware copies
the contents of boot ROM to SRAM and the reset vector points
directly to SRAM. That means the boot ROM is able to clean
up parts of itself as it executes. To get the remaining parts
(that were cleaned up), we had to glitch different parts of the
boot ROM (running in SRAM) and gain code execution earlier
and earlier on. Each time we dump more code, we gain more
information and can develop more specific glitch targets. The
details of these additional injected faults and their subsequent
exploitation is beyond the scope of this paper.
IV. CONCLUSION
By looking at how voltage glitches introduce timing viola-
tions into a digital circuit, we can find good snippets of code
to glitch. Once a target is found, we can search for the right
timing parameters for our crowbar circuit to cause a fault.
We do an exhaustive search because it is difficult to predict
how changing the parameters N and M actually affects the
CMOS circuits. Finally, the injected fault introduces a software
vulnerability that can be exploited to gain code execution. All
of this can be done at a low cost thanks to the open hardware
interface of the ChipWhisperer. With a custom script written
for ChipWhisperer, we created a working attack on a security
hardened consumer device.
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APPENDIX A
CODE
A. Custom ChipWhisperer with eMMC Triggering
https://github.com/TeamMolecule/chipwhisperer
B. Parameters Search Script
https://github.com/TeamMolecule/petite-mort
